

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 2, Folder 14

January 5, 1954 -
February 15, 1954

0520

Bates, Box III

Outgoing, 1954

Problems of historical analysis, both factual and administrative.

Captain Havard, 12 March 1954
Distribution of Battle Analysis

Matters to be discussed in Washington about 22 May 1954
Plagiarism in Naval Institute
Article on Air Sea Rescue--issue of May 1954

Dear McCorkle, 1 July 1954
Manner in which study of Leyte Gulf Battle was
reviewed by competent officers

Dear Bud (Yeomans), 17 August 1954
Submarines changing objective
BUNGO SUIDO

Admiral Goodwin, 18 August 1954
Cribbage championship of WestPac

Dear John (Heffernan), 18 August 1954
Halsey's command practice

Dear Admiral Tichenor, 26 August 1954
Admiral's Yeomans and Momsen's comments on influence
of Medals Award Board on perceptions and decisions of
Submarine Commanding Officers

Dear Jimmy (Fife), 31 August 1954
General comments on Nimitz trip and the reactions of
submarine people to Bates analyses

Dear Murray, 7 September 1954
Death of Admiral Kalbfus

Dear Frank (Watkins), 22 September 1954
Portraits of War College Presidents!

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 May 1953
Rear Admiral Redman
To Fleet Admiral Nimitz
Discussion of "Where is Task Force 34"
Dispatch to Halsey.
This is very important and very clear.

0521

Dear Frog (Low), 11 October 1954
Submarine operations and procedures for relief

Dear Frog (Low), 4 October 1954
Philosophy of Battle Analysis and comparison to
Morison's histories and Admiral Nimitz' reactions to it

Dear Frog (Low), 22 September 1954
Logistics at Naval War College

Hurricanes Carol and Edna in Newport.

Admiral Struble, 8 November 1954
Command at Leyte Gulf
Hanson Baldwin's comment: sinking of Musashi

Dear Rollo

0522

January 4, 1954

Dear Carl:

I received your letter of recent date with interest as I did not think that any of the so-called "sensitive material" was within the Naval War College. Certainly the Naval War College did not realize that the material forwarded was of the type to which you referred.

We do not believe that any more of such material is within the War College but, if it is, perhaps one of your representatives can track it down. We do have here "CINCPAC Underlays" for October which have no classification whatsoever but which otherwise resemble closely the documents which you have listed as "sensitive". These underlays are very large and show the tracks of the Allied ships and here and there a contact report on Japanese shipping which lists the originator's dispatch number. These have been employed for reference on rare occasions in the World War II Battle Evaluation Group.

If you desire I will send you these underlays and you can determine for yourself whether or not they are sensitive or if you prefer I shall be happy to receive one of your assistants for the purpose of checking what papers we have.

Thank you very much for your kind wishes regarding the New Year and the Holiday Season. Barbara and I had a very pleasant time and culminated the New Year's Season by giving a large reception on New Year's Day at our quarters at Fort Adams. This was an Army tradition of many years and I thought it well to perpetuate it. It seems to have been happily received.

With best wishes to you and yours, I am,

Sincerely,

THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR.,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, USN
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

*written by
Commo Bates*

0523

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 5, 1954

Dear John:

During Monday and Tuesday of next week I plan to be in Washington to discuss certain matters with a number of people. I wish to see you in particular and I will now tell you why.

Volume I for the Battle of Leyte Gulf is in BUPERS awaiting publication. It is being held up pending a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations relative to distribution. Although this is of no interest to you, the question hinges on whether the distribution is to be effected by the Naval War College or by BUPERS. Meanwhile, I have felt that it would be wise to have certain of the documents employed in this volume downgraded to confidential. I have written OP-32 requesting the documents which I feel should be downgraded. I do not think that it is necessary to downgrade them insofar as my analysis is concerned because under Executive Order 10501 of November 5th, 1953, Section 3, Paragraph (a), the responsibility for classification is a function of the Naval War College. It is our opinion that it deserves no higher classification than that given previous analyses, i.e., Coral Sea, Midway and Savo Island. However, it is always well to have documents declassified so that they can be properly used.

Present day instructions require disclosure forms everytime a top secret paper is removed from the Archives.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter which I have sent to OP-32 for downgrading to a maximum of confidential, since it is my understanding that you will do the downgrading. I am hoping that you will turn your people to on these documents so that when I arrive down there on Monday you will be able to give me the downgrading desired. It is my belief that there is nothing in Volume I which in anyway violates the security of the classification category and therefore Section 3, Paragraph (a) of the above Executive Order is applicable.

With very best regards and best wishes for a Happy New Year, I am,

Rear Admiral John B. Heffernan, USN Your old friend,
Director of Naval History
Room 2509 MAIN NAVY
Department of the Navy
Encl/ Washington 25, D.C.

R.W. BATES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0524

AIRMAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY

January 5, 1954

Dear Captain Denny:

I am in receipt of your speedletter and realize your interest in getting published Volume I of the Battle for Leyte Gulf. I am also interested in publishing it, but a matter has arisen which recommends delay.

I have discovered that some of the documents used for reference have not as yet been suitably downgraded. I am therefore writing a letter today to OP-32 requesting an immediate clearance of these documents. Very frankly, what we have taken out of the documents I do not consider to be classified at all. As a matter of fact, some historical volumes now appearing, such as the Army and Air Force Histories, make reference to a number of these documents. However, it seems wise for the record to have these documents downgraded at least for the use of the Naval War College in the preparation of these analyses. Actually, I think it likely that all of them have been downgraded to unclassified in view of their use in the unclassified volumes above referred to.

I therefore request that you delay publishing this volume until a clearance as above requested has been received. Meanwhile, I will be in Washington next Monday and Tuesday and will drop in to see you.

With best regards, I am,

Sincerely,

R.W. BATES

Captain James B. Denny, USN
PERS Room 3072 Arlx
Navy Department
Navy Annex
Washington 25, D. C.

0525

January 14, 1954

Dear Dr. Morton:

I have been wondering whether your section, in researching for the Army History of the Battle for Leyte Gulf, has uncovered any information on the Japanese Army which would either support or discount their claims in post-war accounts that they (Japanese Army GHQ) were unduly influenced by the Navy's fantastic claims of damage to Halsey's fleet in the Battle off Formosa. Although I am writing the naval analysis, I consider it very pertinent to the discussion if the Japanese Army was influenced to change its plans by these false claims.

I have some information from Japanese Army sources which indicates that these claims of damage led them to believe that the Allies were attempting the Leyte landing without adequate carrier air support. With land bases too far removed to support the landing, the above sources state that this factor made it very advantageous for them to fight the decisive land battle at Leyte instead of waiting for the invasion of Luzon as had been previously planned. As you remember, the Japanese Army had planned to defend Leyte--or any other landing point outside Luzon--with the defense forces already there, and did not intend to land major reinforcements.

Information recently translated by Mrs. Tanaka makes it impossible for me to accept the above explanation without further considerably more documentary evidence. Japanese Army Headquarters recorded in their "Daily Record of the War Situation" that on October 19th they had intelligence information locating "twenty-eight large carriers, fourteen small carriers, and forty escort carriers off the Philippines." In addition, we have a dispatch sent by Commander FIFTH Base Air Force (FIRST Air Fleet) in the Philippines shortly after noon on October 19th and reporting contacts on Allied forces made earlier on that date. These contacts include twenty-one carriers (sixteen large and five escort carriers). Thus, if the Army intelligence report on large and small carriers were accepted as only one-third correct it would indicate an Allied carrier strength considerably in excess of that expected by either the Army or the Navy. This fact taken with the contacts reported on October 19th,

0526

the day before the landing, could only have indicated that few if any Allied carriers had been destroyed and that the Japanese had lost the air battle off Formosa without question. The reasons given in the Japanese Army Monograph and in Colonel Hattori's history for the October 20th decision to change the plan are therefore not supported by the facts available. MacArthur's history gives this date as October 18th. This, of course, is also not supported by the facts because at that time there had been no confirmation that Leyte was to be the Allied major landing point. Actually at this time (October 18th) CinC Southern Army reported to Imperial General Headquarters (Army Section) (Daily Record of the War Situation) that he thought that the Allied operations off Leyte were (1) a reconnaissance in force or (2) a blockade of Leyte. It was not until October 19th that Allied transports were observed closing Leyte and set the pattern for the Leyte landing as a major Allied landing point.

As for Colonel Hattori, I also have extracts from his original records made at Imperial General Headquarters, obtained through Captain Ohmae, which record a different story on dates and times than that in his history. Therefore, it seems that Colonel Hattori's history is not even correct when compared with his own basic data and that his history is biased--at least on this point.

I am enclosing herewith a draft of what, at the present time, appears to be correct. The sources of information are indicated in the draft. I would very much appreciate your comments and any data you may have uncovered which would tend to vitiate this analysis.

It was nice to talk to you on the telephone. I hope you did not object to my calling you at your home but my time in Washington was short--my needs pressing.

With best regards, and with keep appreciation of your many courtesies, I am, as ever,

Sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Encl/

Dr. Louis Morton:
Office of Military History
Department of the Army
Room 624
119 D Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.

0527

January 14, 1954

Dear Captain Nutting:

This is to thank you very much for the interest you are displaying on the work of the World War II Battle Evaluation Group of the Naval War College.

I am particularly interested in the fact that you are reading Volume I and II of the Leyte Gulf action. I hope that you will find them up to the high standard you are seeking.

Volume I, of course, is complete whereas Volume II will have to be reviewed by a number of people of which you are one. You can see from the format of Volume I there will have to be a foreword, table of contents and a brief of the Volume preceding Chapter I.

I am sending as an enclosure herewith a plate of the operations against Leyte Gulf by the Advance Forces which I hope you will insert between pages 6 and 7.

As I told you over the telephone, I have arrived nowhere as yet with OP-54 although they are quite friendly. I await your recommendations regarding 1100 personnel.

Please give my best regards to Admiral Larson who will have returned by the time you receive this letter. Tell him that all my problems, if any, with Naval Intelligence have been completely cleared up and that my score was 100%. In other words, there was nothing to worry about whatsoever.

I have as yet heard nothing from the distribution letter sent to the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval War College Serial 3171-53 dtd 21 December 1953) so I have today forwarded a tracer. Perhaps you can move this along yourself if you know who the action agency on it is.

With Best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

Encl/

Captain Kelvin L. Nutting, USN
PERS Room 3077
Arlington Annex
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

R.W. BATES

0528

January 18, 1954

Dear Mary:

I am returning to you via Officer Messenger your copy of your "U.S. Naval Group, China - Activities of", which you loaned the War College.

We took very little out of it, but were pleased to see how you conducted your operations in China so successfully.

I appreciate your courtesies to me and wish you well in your new assignment as Commandant FIFTEENTH Naval District.

With very best regards, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES

Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles, USN
Commandant FIFTEENTH Naval District
c/o Fleet Post Office
New York, N.Y.

0529

January 21, 1954

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Since our visit to Film Graphics in New York, I have been thinking over some of my objections to the film, as at present constituted, and my objections to some of Mr. Blair's present procedures. My objections to the film are several and I am sure that you are entirely familiar with them. They are: (1) I do not like the pictures of the commanders in blue uniforms and white hats. However, in view of your opinion that it doesn't make that much difference I am not going to hold out in this, although I should have preferred to have the Allied naval commanders in khaki since the battle was fought in the tropics. I succeeded in accomplishing this in the Midway film. (2) I feel that there is a tendency on the part of Mr. Blair, who is surprisingly familiar with naval matters, to rely on Mr. David Salter who naturally is not very conversant with these matters, and therefore, some technical matters get fouled up. Don't imagine from this that I am critical of Mr. Salter. On the contrary I think that he is very clever indeed but requires more direct guidance than he seems to be getting.

Now the reference to Mr. Blair's procedures. In all of my associations with Mr. Blair heretofore I have found him to be an extremely friendly and highly intelligent contractor who was anxious in every way to produce a correct picture, not only for his firm's good name but out of loyalty to his country. In the Battle of the Coral Sea film he went miles out of his way to be helpful. So much so that I was afraid to ask him for too much because of his obvious effort to do a good job even at a loss. On account of this I was pleased that he had obtained this contract because I felt sure that he understood our problem. In this picture however, he seems on occasions to be a different Mr. Blair. He is constantly talking about cost and time and because of this seems unwilling to make logical changes for which he is personally responsible. Perhaps the storyboard took too much time.

My particular irritation is the sketches of the commanders. Long before the storyboard had been completed I was anxious about these sketches and I repeatedly asked to see them.

0530

Mr. Blair invariably replied that he would show them to me when he had assembled them; that he was having trouble getting the photographs which, of course, was true. This question of the sketches was one of my reasons for wishing to see this film before they got too far into it.

I have now seen Part I twice. When I saw it the first time --you were not present--I was not impressed with the few sketches shown in the film and asked him to show me the other sketches. Mr. Salter, after some delay, went out and procured them. I noted that some of them, notably that of Admiral McCain, were quite poor, but others such as Admiral Leary, were not too good either. These latter sketches had not as yet been employed in the film. I told Mr. Blair that I wished the poor ones re-done and I pointed out the poor ones. I thought, from my previous association with him, that he was going to make new sketches and in furtherance of this view I wrote to Washington to try to obtain these photographs. You can imagine my surprise then to observe upon my last New York trip that the very sketches which I had requested changed had been incorporated in the film, apparently without change. That is what I meant by the term "fait accompli" which you objected to. It wasn't you that I was objecting to at all, as you are familiar with my problem, but with Mr. Blair whom I thought was also familiar with it. I told Mr. Blair in New York last week that I wanted the sketches improved. He said that he would improve them in later footage of the film, but that it was too expensive to change those already done. That, naturally, surprised me, because the sketches were not in the storyboard but were put in later by Film Graphics.

I know that you will be in New York before I am. I don't want to have any difficulties with Mr. Blair because I am very fond of him and because his association heretofore with the War College has been superb and likely will continue to be providing we can get ourselves correctly oriented. However, both you and I must have the right to object and unless it can be shown that we are in error our objections must be sustained. If this is not so, why are we there?

In making the Battle of Midway film I had serious problems because of difficulties with Audio Productions. They would not let me see the film until they had completed a large part of it. Therefore, since I found it unsatisfactory, I rejected most of the completed film. This caused a mild sensation because Audio said that they had received instructions from Washington on how the film should be made and were told that it was to be "theatrical and dramatic".

I informed them that this was entirely in error; that what we wanted was something else and that no command except the Naval War College knew what we were after and even the War College was not entirely sure.

I certainly don't want to encounter the same problems with this Savo Island film. I want it to be outstanding since it has everything to make it so, and since it is the first critical film of a defeat made by the Navy. However, I cannot sit idly by and knowingly allow it to become mediocre since its educational value would then be seriously lessened. Fortunately, I am not too concerned about this because I feel that both the Naval Photographic Center through you, and the Naval War College through me, desire to produce a film which is a credit both to the Naval War College and to the Naval Photographic Center. I feel from what you have told me of the things Mr. Blair is doing about this film and from my previous association with him that these comments also apply to Film Graphics.

I am going to write a letter to Mr. Blair to ask him to change that "South Pac" item to SOPAC throughout. You were correct in wanting it so changed. I was wrong in not accepting your view entirely. However, I was reluctant to start "disagreements" on the first play; I thought it would be well to reserve these "disagreements" if any until later on when they might be better received.

Please convey my warmest regards to my old friend Captain McElroy whom I am sure understands fully what we are trying to accomplish in this film and the necessity for close inspection.

With best wishes, I am,

Very sincerely,

R.W. BATES.

Mr. G.I. Johnson
U.S. Naval Photographic Center
U.S. Naval Air Station Anacostia
Washington, D.C.

January 21, 1954

Dear Carl:

This is to thank you very much for your letter of January 15th in reply to my letter of January 4th.

I concur that "sensitive" material should be protected since that is the national policy. Therefore, I have directed Commodore Bates to send you the unclassified underlays which the World War II Battle Evaluation Group of the War College obtained from the U.S. Naval Records Management Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa.

If you do not find them sensitive I should like to have them returned as they become useful on occasions in checking the movements and dispositions of forces.

With regard to the other matter, a visit by a top officer of your Security Policy Section to the War College for the purpose of answering questions on security matters might be helpful. Therefore, if you care to send such an officer I shall be happy to receive him. Security is very important these days and I am anxious to insure that my staff understands thoroughly all of the more recent instructions issued on it.

You will be interested to know that I was present the other day at the Sikorsky showing of their latest helicopters and today I was present at the launching of the NAUTILUS. Since both the helicopter and the nuclear powered submarine represent our latest advances in weapons you can imagine my pleasure in observing them. They both have a place in our War College studies.

With very best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR.

Rear Admiral Carl E. Espe, USN
Chief of Naval Intelligence
OP-32 (PENTAGON BUILDING)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

*Written by
Commo Bates*

0533

January 21, 1954

Dear Captain Moore:

I had been interested in receiving from you the list of officers whom you recommend as reliefs for the 1300 officers in my section here at the War College.

It was my understanding when I left Washington that you planned to send me such a list.

You need have no concern about that list which I had of War College graduates recommended for the Staff. I have since learned that the list was made up by the War College Staff, as you said, and it was well-known that you were not available, so why star you.

I enjoyed my conversation with you when I was in Washington last week, and I appreciated extremely the amount of time and effort you and Captain Christopher gave to me in an endeavor to solve my problem.

I can see your difficulties and I want to do what I can to help you, as well as to help myself. This is definitely a "mutual" proposition.

With very best regards, I am,

Cordially yours,

R.W. BATES

Captain R.B. Moore, USN
OPNAV Room 4E416 PENTAGON
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

0534

January 23, 1954

My dear Mr. Reynolds:

I have just received your invitation to attend the reception which you are giving in honor of Captain Walter Karig on January 26th. I regret that the invitation came too late for me to accept as I have other commitments here.

Captain Karig has been with the Navy for a long time, and has many accomplishments to his credit. I first met him on his return from a trip to Iceland where he had been with Admiral "Ike" Giffin's cruisers. This I think was in 1941. Upon the arrival of Admiral Giffin in Newport from Iceland I was invited to join him at the Muenchinger-King hotel here. I hastened over and met numerous correspondents who had been with the Admiral on this trip. They had just composed a song on Iceland to the tune of "Maryland, My Maryland." It was very humorous but slightly off color. We all sang it lustily. You had better ask him about it because it is quite clever and you may desire to sing it.

With best wishes for Captain Karig's success in his return to civilian life and with appreciation of his accomplishments in the Navy, I am,

Very truly yours,

R.W. BATES
Rear Admiral (Ret)

J. Lacey Reynolds
Correspondent
National Press Building
Washington, D. C.

0535

January 25, 1954

Dear Raymond:

It was indeed a pleasure last Saturday to have discovered you in the "Dedication of the Altar" Mass at St John's Monastery. Naturally, neither you nor I knew many people there, and therefore it was gratifying to see at least one old friend from out of town.

After leaving the Monastery I got a brilliant idea that it might be well to invite both you and Mrs. Wilson to lunch with Miss Newcomb and me at the Ritz. So I called you at your club at least three times because I understood that you were to have coffee. However, when I failed to contact you I decided to drop the idea of lunch at the Ritz, and proceeded home. The trip back was rugged as the snow was falling heavily.

Miss Newcomb, as you know, is head of the Red Cross here. She was very pleased to see you and appears to remember you well from your service here during the war. I think that she feels that she knows you better than she does me! It was nice of her to guide me to the Monastery, because my traffic directions, while correct, would have taken me through the heart of the city. I tried to bring a number of people with me, but Miss Newcomb (a Baptist) was the only one who was willing to go. She was quite surprised at the rituals of the Anglican Church and probably thinks we are heretics to PROTESTANTISM. If she does, she is sadly off base, because it is not the ritual which makes the difference- it is one's beliefs.

I thought that the Dedication Mass was beautifully conducted. I have talked to Mrs. Wilson since about it and she is brimming over with happiness at the manner in which it was done.

I hope you have an interesting time on the Selection Board. I don't envy you your job, but it is very important.

With best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

Raymond Emory Meeh, M.D.
729 Park Avenue
New York, New York

R.W. BATES

*Jack Bergin was operated on for that liver
at Mayo's Rochester Minn. I hope all is well.*

0536

January 25, 1954

Dear Admiral Larson:

I want to thank you very much for your letter. It came in very good time and I informed Commander Cushing of your decision.

I likewise informed Captain Johnson of the OCS who was very interested indeed as he is constantly being queried about many things.

New subject. I want to talk to you now about Commander Charles A. Marinke, USN of my staff. As you perhaps know Commander Marinke has had difficulty with his "innards" and for some time has been on limited duty with stomach ulcers. However, last year he was given a clean bill of health, but, in view of the fact that he had only recently received this clearance, Commander Marinke thought it well to remain ashore for another year. I consulted a number of high officers in this decision, one of whom I think was you, and all agreed that his decision in this matter was correct.

He now feels well enough to go to sea and is looking forward to a command. He is anxious to be promoted and, in my mind, is well qualified for advancement. To his concern therefore, and mine as well, he has received information, reportedly coming from the Commander Detail Officer, to the effect that he was being considered for the staff of CinCFE. While this probably counts as sea duty there is considerable doubt in my mind that it would replace sea duty in the collective mind of a selection board. Of course I do not know what today's standards are in these matters.

Would I be asking too much of you to review or have reviewed Commander Marinke's record and make a general recommendation thereon for his next assignment that he might be given the best advantage possible for promotion under the circumstances?

With very best regards, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral Harold O. Larson, USN
PERS Room 3074 Arlx
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

0537

January 26, 1954

Dear Mr. Blair:

With reference to the Battle of Savo Island film which you are preparing, I want to be sure that the changes recommended last time are made effective; notably the idea concerning "South Pac" which should have been "SOPAC."

If you will remember there was one additional South Pac to SOPAC change which some how was over-looked in the shuffle. I don't know if I am clear on this because I don't remember exactly where it was but I remember that Mr. Johnson pointed it out and somehow we didn't entirely follow his advice. Anyway he was right. Wherever it was, I am sure that what we all want to do is to make it right.

I certainly hope that you are having success in making some of those photographs resemble more closely the commanders concerned.

I talked to Admiral Conolly on the telephone the other night and he, despite the fact that he is President of Long Island University, still has an interest in the film and expects it to be very superior. In fact, I think, to quote him he said, "Terrific." I concur with him providing we can keep the story straight.

It is for that reason that I am touchy regarding inaccuracies in matters which you may feel are not as important as I do.

Please don't get too far advanced on the film without letting me and Mr. Johnson see it as it will save problems in the end.

With very best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair
Film Graphics Inc.
245 W. 55th Street
New York, New York

0538

January 27, 1954

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Since writing my last letter to you I happened to see a fifteen minute color film on Command of the Sea--MN 7459B-1952. I don't know who put the film out as it was shown at a meeting of a Club here, but I noted that it had a considerable amount of night action in color. It struck me that most of the color film of the night action, except one picture which seems to be the bow of a NEW JERSEY class battleship, might be suitable for our film.

Perhaps you will oppose this on the ground that interposing some color film against non-color film is not a good idea. I won't argue with you on this at all as I know nothing about it. If in your opinion it is best to stick to straight gray rather than to mix in some color film that is the end of the matter.

In my last letter to you I forgot to say that the film as a whole is excellent so far but what is bothering me is my seeming inability to get logical errors corrected if they cost money. I am going to write Captain McElroy a letter on this subject presently in order to insure that we do not get stuck in the dreadful financial mess that we got into with the Midway Film. I had to obtain some \$100,000(?) extra for that film because of this. The money, then to my surprise, instead of being made available to make the changes I desired was given to the company to pay for the mistakes they had made prior to my disapproval of the film. I know that Captain McElroy, as well as yourself, is as determined as I am to confine these expenditures to the money allotted. It seems to me, however, that the only way that this can be done is by very careful supervision so that mistakes are not made by the contractor.

With very best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Mr. G.I. Johnson
U.S. Naval Photographic Center
U.S. Naval Air Station Anacostia
Washington, D.C.

0539

21 January 1954

Dear Carl:

This is to thank you very much for your letter of 15 January in reply to my letter of 4 January.

I concur that "sensitive" material should be protected since that is the national policy. Therefore, I have directed Commodore Bates to send you the unclassified underlays which the World War II Battle Evaluation Group of the War College obtained from the U.S. Naval Records Management Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

If you do not find them sensitive I should like to have them returned as they become useful on occasions in checking the movements and dispositions of forces.

With regard to the other matter, a visit by a top officer of your Security Policy Section to the War College for the purpose of answering questions on security matters might be helpful. Therefore, if you care to send such an officer, I shall be happy to receive him. I recognize the importance of security, and I am anxious to insure that my staff understands thoroughly all of the more recent instructions issued on it.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, USN
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Written by Como RW Robbins

0540

February 2, 1954

Dear Captain McElroy:

As you know, we are making a film "Battle of Savo Island" at Film Graphics in New York. As you also know, this film is being made at the express request of the Naval War College. I personally appeared before the Film Board and, with the help of the Chiefs of Bureaus and DCNOs, succeeded in getting the production of the film approved. Therefore, the War College necessarily has an overriding interest in this film.

Your representative, Mr. G.I. Johnson also has a great interest in that he represents you. Very frankly, he has been of considerable help in assisting in the production of a tip-top storyboard. He is very helpful now in helping the Naval War College through me to obtain a film which reflects Naval War College thinking.

I realize that the responsibility for this film is in the major part yours. However, as I have repeatedly explained to the High Command in Washington, these are no ordinary pictures. Actually, they are my idea alone, and since I was not entirely sure of what I hoped to accomplish in the first film I had difficulty in selling the Battle of the Coral Sea Film to the Film Board. Fortunately I did not have much difficulty with Mr. Lee Blair of Film Graphics for the reason that Mr. Blair was familiar with naval operations, wished to make the film the way we wanted it, and went to great efforts to accomplish this. He, of course, knew from his naval experience in the war, that a film which was not satisfactory to the Naval War College would be immediately and flatly rejected.

However, when I tried to do the Battle of Midway film with a new firm, Audio Productions, also in New York, I encountered great difficulties because they tried to make a film for a movie theatre, had no concepts of what I was after, and didn't let me see the film until it was far advanced. When I did see it, it was so alien to what we wished, despite the fact that your Mr. Southgate was helping them

0541

with it, that I rejected it. Of course, you are familiar with all of this. Despite these difficulties we finally produced an outstanding film. However, the film cost more money than it would have cost had proper attention been paid to the requirements of the Naval War College.

With this Battle of Savo Island film, since we have drawn "a storyboard" and since we have Mr. Blair directing the film, I do not anticipate too much trouble. However, I do want to reiterate that this film must be satisfactory to the Naval War College, or the money has been wasted.

It has been the practice in the past to bring each part of the film, as it is completed and before the sound track has been attached, to the Naval War College where it is shown to the President of the Naval War College, and to any members of the Staff whom he may designate, to insure that if any error has been made it can be readily corrected. In fact, I have already received a request from the President of the Naval War College that he be informed of the showings so that he can be present.

I have gone to lengths in this letter so that there can be a complete understanding between your office, which has the responsibility for the production of the film, and the Naval War College which requested the film and therefore has the inherent right to the final approval from the War College viewpoint.

I am awfully glad that you are in command down there because I know that you understand as well as I do the necessity for a cooperative effort to the end that the best film possible is made of an unhappy event, i.e., our defeat at Savo Island.

For your information, my present opinion of the film is that it is coming along reasonably well. My principal disappointment is that Film Graphics has not succeeded in getting a suitable likeness of some of the Commanders, notably Admiral J.S. McCain. I have told Mr. Blair and Mr. Johnson of my dissatisfaction in this regard and I hope to achieve better results than has been achieved at present.

Another disappointment is the necessity for keeping a weather eye on the artists in that they get conceptions which are not good naval practices. However, I suppose that that is true of all films and is one reason for technical advisors.

0542

I hope to be in Washington some time this month and I will then make it a point to visit you at your establishment. I visited your predecessors and was quite impressed to note the size and importance of your command.

With very best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Captain John H. McElroy, USN
Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Photographic Center
U.S. Naval Air Station
Anacostia
Washington, D.C.

RWB/mwb

February 2, 1954

Dear Admiral Larson:

I wrote to Captain Denny today to tell him that the Chief of Naval Operations has approved the distribution by the Chief of Naval Personnel of these "Strategical and Tactical Analyses of World War II Battles".

This was in accordance with your suggestion and I am gratified that it has turned out as it has. We feel here that, as you say, it is quite properly a problem for your office.

I note that there is nothing in the CNO's letter which refers to the distribution list. I haven't taken this up officially, but I don't think that we have any particular attitude as regards the distribution list excepting to insure that it includes all ships of destroyer-type and larger and also the corresponding air commands. In fact I made ours myself with some advice from BuPers.

Do you recommend that you absorb the distribution list function also? Or do you feel it best that we retain it here?

I have notified Captain Denny, who has probably told you, that there is nothing that I know of now which should delay the publication of Volume I. Volume II, of course, has to be reviewed and checked in many places before it will be ready for release.

With best regards, and many thanks for all that you have done for me, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES

Rear Admiral Harold O. Larson, USN
PERS Room 3074 Arlx
Department of the Navy
Navy Annex (Arlington)
Washington 25, D.C.

0544

February 2, 1954

Dear Captain Denny:

I note that the Chief of Naval Operations has approved our recommendation that the "Strategical and Tactical Analyses of the WWII Battles" be distributed by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

I presume that you have a copy of this letter since the reply of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval War College letter was made to the Chief of Naval Personnel. If you have not received this letter, it is CNO letter Op-202R/sac, Ser 8775P20 dated 26 January 1954.

Therefore, I can see no reason why Volume I should not be published.

In Appendix II of Volume I, Organization of Allied Forces, under TU 77.1.2 the destroyer ABNER READ may have been misspelled REED. I should appreciate your courtesy if you would note this point and correct the spelling. I would also appreciate it if you would ask Captain Nutting if he would return the copy of Volume I which he has been reading. I don't want to rush him, but I use it here for reference. It is much easier to use it than the rough drafts from which the final copy was made.

With best regards to you, to Admiral Larson, Captain Nutting and Mr. Hession, I am, as ever,

Sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Captain James B. Denny, USN
PERS Room 3072 Arlx
Navy Department
Navy Annex
Washington 25, D.C.

0545

February 12, 1954

Dear Joe:

I received your letter with a great deal of satisfaction not only because you agree with my modified Chapter of October 19th, but also for the happy culmination of your daughter's wedding. It must be a fine thing to get a son that easily. Think of it, you didn't have to get him an education or anything!

Mindful of your interest in the papers that Mrs. Tanaka found, I am enclosing three which may interest you. When you are through with them I should like them returned.

There is little going on this area which would be unusual to you excepting that the weather has been cold with considerable but not permanent snow. Today, for example, is quite cold.

We are moving along here and my prominent problems are (1) to discover why the Japanese divided the FIRST Striking Force into two units, and sent one, called the THIRD Section, through Surigao Strait and (2) to approve or disapprove of this division of forces. At the present moment I thoroughly disapprove of this procedure.

I wrote to Japan and discovered that the speed of the FUSO and YAMASHIRO was $22\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

If you will remember, Admiral Ozawa made a plan wherein he recommended the FIRST Striking Force be made as strong as possible and even recommended the inclusion of a CARDIV.

It is quite clear from the dispatches and from Ozawa's memorandum that the SHO Plan envisaged two surface forces. One the Main Force, the other the FIRST Striking Force. Now suddenly on October 20th or 21st we have the SECOND Striking Force Commander recommending that he come up through Surigao Strait, and Commander THIRD Section being ordered to come up to Surigao also. The net result of this is, that the Japanese had four forces of various degrees of strength approaching Leyte from different directions.

0546

If you will also remember, Commander FIRST Striking Force's estimate included an approach through San Bernardino at twenty knots, and one at sixteen knots. There was no suggestion of higher speeds nor was there any suggestion of dividing forces. I am of the opinion at present that the Japanese idea of having enveloping movements, no matter how fragile, once again overcame good military strategy. The U.S. Navy decided years ago, and proved its correctness throughout the years, that it was better to have a twenty knot battle-line with armor and armament than to throw these away for speed.

As I visualize this situation at present, I think that all seven battleships should have been included bodily into one formation for the cruise to Leyte. Had this been done there would have been more targets available to Allied planes and therefore less hits per ship. Perhaps the MUSHASHI might not have been lost. There would have been more antiaircraft fire and the chances of the command arriving at its destination would have been greater. Have you any thoughts on this?

Another problem of considerable interest is the problem of Nishimura. On October 24th Admiral Nishimura was informed that the FIRST Striking Force was retiring. He continued on and was later directed by Toyoda to continue with the operation as were the other commanders. He did not speed-up as has been stated. The evidence is that he continued on as scheduled so, in this case, it looks that Nishimura will no longer be a bum despite the remarks of Mr. James Field.

With best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN(Ret)
225 Third Street
Manhattan Beach, California

RWB:mwb

0547

February 15, 1954

Dear Admiral Hewitt:

I noted in the February 1954 "Shipmate" that you and Floride were now in Annapolis for a few months. I imagine that you are preparing another one of your highly interesting articles for the Naval Institute.

I am wondering if you will have time to review Volume II of the Battle for Leyte Gulf for me. Heretofore you have reviewed all Volumes and have been extraordinary helpful to me in reassuring me that my estimates are correct. The first Volume which you reviewed for the Battle for Leyte Gulf was prepared up to 0719 October 17th, 1944, the time of Admiral Oldendorf's seizure of the outlying islands. The second Volume takes in October 17th, 18th and 19th which covers Oldendorf's Advance Operations in Leyte Gulf which prepared the way for the landing. Since the Japanese had many decisions to make at this time, the biggest emphasis is on the Japanese side.

I should like to send you a copy of Volume II so that you may read it over and point out my errors. This Volume II shows the great digression between the Japanese Army and Navy in the appreciation of sea power.

The weather up here has been quite cold so I imagine that the Vermont weather has been even worse. I don't know who the wise weather forecaster was who got you out of that icy state and sent you down to the relatively balmy air of "Crab Town".

As you know, Admiral Conolly has left the Naval War College and is now President of Long Island University. This is a tough job because the University is seriously in need of the face-lifting which Admiral Conolly is giving it. He says he hasn't worked so hard in a long time.

0548

The War College is doing well and I certainly hope that you will be up here this summer to see it in action. We have always counted you as one of our most distinguished graduates.

With best regards to you and Floride and with hopes that you will be able to assist me, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES

Admiral Kent Hewitt, USN (Ret)
5 Acton Place
Annapolis, Maryland

RWB:mwb

0549